Managerial market timing is the subject of an extensive body of literature Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler, 2007; Warusawitharana and Whited, 2015. Baker and Wurgler 2002 suggest that corporate managers have incentives to time the market by exploiting possibly perceived misvaluations if they think it possible and if they care more about existing shareholders. Consistently, in their survey of 392 chief financial officers CFOs based in the U.S. and Canada, Graham and Harvey 2001 find that two-thirds of CFOs report that the amount by which their stock is misvalued is an important or very important consideration for equity issuance. Faced with misvaluations in the equity market, the literature suggests that managers’ decision depends on the direction of the misvaluation. While overvaluation and the concentration of retail investors are associated with public offerings, undervaluation seems to be the main motivation for private placements.