This book is the first detailed study of Kant''s method of
''transcendental reflection'' and its use in the Critique of Pure
Reason to identify our basic human cognitive capacities, and to
justify Kant''s transcendental proofs of the necessary a priori
conditions for the possibility of self-conscious human experience.
Kenneth Westphal, in a closely argued internal critique of Kant''s
analysis, shows that if we take Kant''s project seriously in its own
terms, the result is not transcendental idealism but unqualified
realism regarding physical objects. Westphal attends to neglected
topics - Kant''s analyses of the transcendental affinity of the
sensory manifold, the ''lifelessness of matter'', fallibilism, the
semantics of cognitive reference, four externalist aspects of
Kant''s views, and the importance of Kant''s Metaphysical Foundations
for the Critique of Pure Reason - that illuminate Kant''s enterprise
in new and valuable ways. His book will appeal to all who are
interested in Kant''s theoretical philosophy.
目錄:
Introduction
1. Kant''s methods: transcendental and epistemic reflection
2. The metaphysics of Kant''s transcendental idealism
3. Transcendental affinity
4. The gap in Kant''s Critique of Pure Reason
5. Kant''s dynamic misconstructions
6. Kant''s metaphysical proof of the law of inertia
7. Three Kantian insights
Appendix: Summary of Kant''s Transcendental Proof of the Legitimacy
of Causal Judgments.