1Part I
1.1Of the Sense of Propriety
1.1.1Of Sympathy
1.1.2Of the Pleasure of mutual
Sympathy
1.1.3Of the Manner in which we
judge of the Propriety or Im-
propriety of the Affections of
other Men, by their concord
or dissonance with out
own
1.1.4The same Subject
continued
1.1.5Of the amiable and
respectable Virtues
1.2Of the Degrees of the different Passions
which are consistent with Propriety
1.2.1Of the Passions which take
their origin from the Body
1.2.2Of those Passions which
take their origin from a partic-ular turn or habit of the
Imagination
1.2.3Of the Unsocial
Passions
1.2.4Of the Social
Passions
1.2.5Of the Selfish
Passions
1.3Of the Effects of Prosperity and
Adversity upon the Judgment
of Mankind with regard to the
Propriety of Action; and ''why it
is more easy to obtain their
Approbation in the one state than
in the other
1.3.1That though our sympathy
with Sorrow is generally a
more lively sensation than our
sympathy with Joy, it
commonly falls much more short
of the violence of what
is naturally felt by the person
principally concerned
1.3.2Of the origin of Ambition,
and of the distinction of Ranks
1.3.3Of the corruption of our
Moral Sentiments, which is oc-
casioned by this disposition to
admire the rich and the
great, and to despise or
neglect persons of poor and mean
condition
2Part II
2.1Of the Sense of Merit and Demerit
2.1.1That whatever appears to
be the proper object of grat-
itude, appears to deserve
reward; and that, in the same
manner, whatever appears to be
the proper object of resentment appears to deserve punishment
2.1.2Of the proper Objects of
Gratitude and Resentment
2.1.3That where there is no
approbation of the conduct of the
person who confers the benefit,
there is little sympathy,
with the gratitude of him who
receives it; and that, on the
contrary, where there is no
disapprobation of the motives
of the person who does the
mischief, there is no sort of
sympathy with the resentment of
him who suffers it
2.1.4Recapitulation of the
foregoing Chapters
2.1.5The Analysis of the Sense
of Merit and Demerit
2.2Of Justice and Beneficence
2.2.1Comparison of those two
Virtues
2.2.2. Of the sense of Justice, of
Remorse, and of the conscious-
ness of Merit
2.2.3Of the utility of this
constitution of Nature
2.3Of the Influence of Fortune upon the
Sentiments of Mankind,
with regard to the Merit or Demerit of
Actions
2.3.1Of the Causes of this
Influence of Fortune
2.3.2Of the Extent of this
Influence of Fortune
2.3.3Of the final cause of
this Irregularity of Sentiments
3 Part III
3.1Of the Principle of Self-approbation and of
Self-disapprobation
3.2Of the love of Praise, and of that of
Praise-worthiness; and of the dread of Blame,
and of that of Blame-worthiness
3.3Of the Influences and Authority of Conscience
3.4Of the Nature of Self-deceit, and of the Origin and
Use of general Rules
3.5Of the Influence and
Authority of the general Rules of Morality,
and that they are justly regarded as the
Laws of the Deity
3.6In what cases the Sense of
Duty ought to be the sole Principle
of our Conduct; and in what cases it ought
to concur with other
Motives
4Part IV
4.1Of the Beauty which the Appearance of
Utility bestows upon
all the Productions of Art, and of the
extensive Influence of this
Species of Beauty
4.2Of the Beauty which the Appearance of
Utility bestows upon
the Characters and Actions of Men; and how
far the Perception
of this Beauty may be regarded as one of
the original Principles
of Approbation
5 Part V
5.1Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion
upon our notions of
Beauty and Deformity
5.2Of the Influence of Custom and Fashion
upon Moral Sentiments
6 Part VI
6.1Of the Character of the Individual, so
far as it affects his own
Happiness; or of Prudence
6.2Of the Character of the Individual, so
far as it can affect the
Happiness of other People
6.2.1Of the Order in which
Individuals are recommended by
Nature to our care and attention
6.2.2Of the Order in which
Societies are by nature recommended to our Beneficence
6.2.3Of Universal
Benevolence
6.3Of Self-command
7 Part VII
7.1Of the Questions which ought to be
examined in a Theory of
Moral Sentiments
7.2Of the different Accounts which have
been given of the Nature of Virtue
7.2.1Of those Systems which
make Virtue consist in Propriety
7.2.2Of those Systems which
make Virtue consist in Prudence
7.2.3Of those Systems which
make Virtue consist in Benevolence
7.2.4Of Licentious
Systems
7.3Of the Different Systems which have been
Formed Concerning
the Principle of Approbation
7.3.1Of those Systems which
deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-love
7.3.2Of those Systems which
make Reason the Principle of Approbation
7.3.3Of those Systems which
make Sentiment the Principle of Approbation
7.4Of the Manner in which different Authors
have treated of the
practical Rules of Morality